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CASE NOTES
clause against a non-signer is much different from enforcing the entire
agreement against him. When a dispute is sent to an arbitrator, it is assumed
that he will render the most equitable decision possible. Flatly enforcing
other parts of the agreement such as fixed wage rates or seniority terms
against the successor may not be a terrible burden on him where he takes
over an intact operation. In cases, however, where employees have been
moved into the successor's work force, inequities within the plant will soon
lead to industrial strife. The existence of separate agreements covering
workers whose duties and qualifications do not differ can lead at least to poor
morale and at most to strikes.
Even if the Reliance court were to limit its broad holding to cases
where no transfer of employees has taken place, it must be kept in mind that
Wiley is not the basis for any case following the Reliance -Wackenhut dicta.
The courts of the Third and Ninth Circuits seem to have forgotten in their
zeal to enforce collective bargaining agreements against non-signers that the
initial decision to abrogate contract theory and to compel a non-signer to
arbitrate was founded on the policy favoring arbitration as a means of
achieving industrial peace.
THOMAS j. CAMERON
Labor Law—Labor Management Relations Act—Sections 9(b) and
9(c) (5)—Extent of Organization as Controlling Factor.—Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB. 1—Insurance Workers International Union,
AFL-CIO, requested the National Labor Relations Board to certify it as bar-
gaining representative for all twenty-threes debit agents at the Woonsocket,
Rhode Island, district office of the petitioner, a nation-wide insurance cor-
poration with over I,000 district offices . 3 Woonsocket was one of eight dis-
trict offices maintained in Rhode Island by petitioner, all of which are within
greater Providence. The nearest district office to Woonsocket is twelve miles
away, in Pawtucket. The Board certified the union, but petitioner claimed
that the only appropriate certifiable units would be (1) all its offices in the
United States, (2) all its offices in its New England Territory, or (3) all its
offices in Rhode Island. Petitioner asserted that in certifying this unit, the
Board treated as solely controlling the extent of employee organization, in
violation of Section 9(c) (5) of the Labor Management Relations Act. 4 On
petition to review and set aside the Board's order, the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit HELD: Order set aside and enforcement denied; the Board
had violated section 9(c) (5) of the Act since extent of organization appeared
to control the Board's decision, no other basis appearing therein.
A vague and ambiguous term, extent of organization can mean either
the geographical extent to which a union has been organized, or the intensive
1 327 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 32 U.S.L. Week 3115 (U.S. Oct. 12,
1964) (No. 98).
2 Brief for Respondent, p. 4.
8
 Brief for Petitioner, p. 6.
4 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (5) (1958).
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blanketing of a single plant or district by a union seeking I o organize. For its
use as a standard in determining the certifiability of a union as bargaining
representative, the latter definition alone has meaning.° It was in this sense
that the Taft-Hartley Act used the phrase when it provided:
Sec. 9(b) The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to
assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights
guaranteed by this [Act], the unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, or sub-
division thereof. . . .
Sec. 9(c) (5) In determining whether a unit is appropriate for the
purposes specified in subsection (b) . . . the extent to which the
employees have organized shall not be controlling.°
Extent of organization was one of many factors early considered by the
NLRB to test petitions for certification.? Other factors were, for example,
whether there had been a history of informal collective bargaining among
the employees involved,° whether the employees were segregated according to
skill,° and whether there was present a functional coherence" or a similar
method of paying wages." It also looked to the administrative structure of
the employer's business," and to the employees' own preferences."
Prior to 1944, the Board had at times allowed extent of organization to
control its certification of single-district office units" and city-wide units. 16
In Prudential Ins. Co.," a case in which a petition for a unit comprising a
single district office was denied, the Board, in dictum, noted that:
the ultimately appropriate unit of insurance agents is the company-
wide unit; and we have established less comprehensive units solely
on the basis of the limited extent of self-organization among the
employees affected. (Emphasis supplied.) 17
In a later case, also by way of dictum, the Board said:
Based upon the extent of organization among employees of an
employer, we have frequently found appropriate for bargaining pur-
poses small groups of employees with a provision for revision of a
unit upon a later showing of broader organization. 18
5 Sec Mueller, Labor Law & Legislation 598 (1949).
6 61 Stat. 142, 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) and (c) (5) (1958).
7 R.C.A. Communications, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 1109, 1115 (1937).
8 Birge & Sons Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 731 (1936).
0 Canton Enameling & Stamping Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 402 (1936).
10 Atlantic Ref. Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 359 (1936).
11 Bendix Prod. Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 173 (1936).
22 Bell Oil & Gas Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 562 (1936).
18 Chrysler Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 164 (1936).
14 Life Ins. Co. of Va., 29 N.L.R.B. 246 (1941) ; John Hancock Mut. Life Ins, Co.,
26 N.L.R.B. 1024 (1940)
15 Life Ins. Co. of Va., supra note 14.
16 49 N.L.R.B. 450 (1943).
17 Id. at 456-57.
18 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1635, 1639 (1944).
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The Board rationalized its use of extent of organization as a controlling factor
in cases which, though not concerning insurance workers, would support the
certification of a single-district office or city-wide unit. Thus, in Gulf Oil
Corp., in which a small unit was certified, the Board stated that it was
"desirable that, in the determination of the appropriate unit, we render
collective bargaining of the Company's employees an immediate possibility."'°
In another case, NLRB v. Hearst Publ., Inc., the United States Supreme
Court, without noting whether extent of organization should be allowed to
control either alone or together with other factors, said that it could find no
"plausible reason ... for withholding the benefits of the Act_from those here
seeking it (sic) until a group of geographically separated employees becomes
interested in collective bargaining." 2°
In 1944, in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 2 ' the Board announced a policy
change in the factors deemed to be of controlling value in certifying bar-
gaining units for insurance agents. While denying a petition to certify a
unit composed of four of Metropolitan's forty-one district offices in Ohio,
the Board stated that certification would hereafter be granted to state-wide
units but denied to single-district offices, city-wide, and all other less than
state-wide units of insurance agents that the Board had formerly certified
on an extent of organization basis.22
 The Board was led to change the con-
trolling standard because of a belief that the collective-bargaining trend in
the insurance industry was toward state-wide units."
Following the 1944 Metropolitan Life decision, the Board adhered to its
policy of finding only state-wide units of insurance agents appropriate for
bargaining purposes,24 and dismissing representation petitions filed by unions
seeking representation on a less than state-wide basis. 25
The passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 did for all industries what
the Metropolitan rule of 1944 had done for the insurance industry: it pre-
vented extent of organization from being treated as the controlling factor in
unit determinations. Therefore, the Board was restrained from returning to
the pre-1944 certification practices insofar as they related to the recognition
of extent of organization as controlling.
According to Senator Taft, one of the sponsors of the Act, section 9(c)
(5) was aimed at eliminating (or preventing the return to) the practice of
the Board in allowing extent of organization to control where all other valid
tests failed to give the union the unit it desired. Responding to those who
might say that it will now be impossible for unions to organize the insurance
industry, Senator Taft said:
19 4 N.L.R.B. 133, 137 (1937).
20 322 U.S. 111, 135 (1944).
21 Supra note 18, at 1640.
22 Id. at 1639. In an earlier case, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 43 N.L.R.B. 962, 968
(1942), the Board had noted that the manner of supervision of the states over the
insurance industry (e.g., requirements to be an agent, tests which the prospective agent
must pass, etc.) made state-wide units particularly appropriate in this field.
23 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra note 18, at 1639.
24 United Ins. Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 843, 848 (1954).
25 Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 392, 393-94 (1950).
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It is sufficient answer to say that the Board has evolved numerous
tests to determine appropriate units, such as community of interest
of employees involved, extent of common supervision, interchange
of employees, geographical considerations, etc., any one of which
may justify the finding of a small unit."
Representative Hartley, the other sponsor of the Act, noted that "While
the Board may take into consideration the extent to which employees have
organized, this evidence should have little weight, and, as section 9(f) (3) 27
provides, it is not to be controlling."28
 Use of extent of organization had re-
sulted in certification of improper units. Other internationals often were al-
lowed to organize the remainder of the natural unit, the result being the
establishment of two or more inappropriate units."
In view of the policy enunciated by the Board in the Metropolitan Life
case in 1944, section 9(c) (5) had no observable impact on the insurance in-
dustry. With statewide organization a requirement, it was impossible for the
individual factor of extent of organization to be considered, let alone to con-
trol.
In 1961, in Quaker City Life Ins. Co.," the Board abandoned the re-
quirement of state-wide organization. 2' In that case, the Board certified a unit
20 93 Cong. Rec. 6860 (1947).
27
 The provision dealing with extent of organization was absent in the Senate
version of the bill, 1 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,
552 (1948), but was contained in the House version under § 9(0 (3). 1 Legislative His-
tory of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 62, 189 (1948). The final version of
the bill, as reported out of the conference committee, contained the provision under
§ 9(c)(5). 2 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 1542
(1948).
28
 1 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 328 (1948).
29
 93 Cong. Rec. 6860 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft). Of course, many legislators
disagreed with Senator Taft and Representative Hartley. Senator Murray: "By the
adoption of section 9(c) (5) they have precluded unions from starting collective bargain-
ing until an entire business is organized, which is, as in the case of Nation-wide insurance
companies, frequently impossible." 93 Cong. Rec. 6497 (1947). Senator Morse: "[lit will
hereafter be difficult and perhaps impossible for unions to organize highly integrated
enterprises like insurance and public utility companies, which necessarily maintain
separate and widely dispersed small operational units." 93 Cong. Rec. 6454 (1947).
ao 134 N.L.R.B. 960 (1961).
81 In 1959, in Life Ins. Co. of Va., 123 N.L.R.B. 610 (1959), the Board adhered to
its requirement of state-wide organization, but the majority was achieved with the vote
of Member Fanning, who, in a separate opinion, at 614-15, gave different views from
the other members of the majority for his vote denying certification:
I would apply to units of insurance agents the same criteria of appropriate-
ness the Board applies to units in retail establishments, such as the administrative
structure of the Employer's operations, geographical separation, centralization
of operations, interchange of personnel, and uniform wages, duties, and working
conditions. . . .
In the present case, on the facts detailed in the majority opinion I would
find that the unit sought does not conform to an administrative division of the
Employer's organization, and the operations are highly centralized, and the
wages, duties, and working conditions are uniform as far as possible throughout
the Employer's organization. Accordingly, I would and do find that a unit
limited to Danville, Virginia, is inappropriate.
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representing one of six district offices operated by the company in Virginia.
The Board stated that its decision to drop the seventeen-year-old rule was
based on the realization that the expected trends in the insurance industry
had "not materialized, and the result of the rule has been to arrest the or-
ganizational development of insurance agents."" With the departure of the
state-wide requirement, extent of organization was again available to the
Board for use as a factor in unit determinations. Under section 9(c) (5), how-
ever, it could not be controlling and was to be allowed only minimal weight.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Board's decision in NLRB v. Quaker
City Life Ins. Co." The court found evidence in the record that (a) the job
specifications of the agents were highly standardized, (b) working conditions
were similar, (c) the office operated in an isolated manner with little or no
contact with other branch offices, (d) no administrative offices operated be-
tween the local offices and the main office, and (e) the district manager had
at least some control over the operating conditions of each employee. There-
fore, over the objection of the company, the court decided that even though
this was not a state-wide unit, extent of organization had not been allowed
to control by the Board. State-wide organization had not been required by
the Board in other industries, and the other factors upon which the Board
based its decision in Quaker City had long since found legislative and judi-
cial approval."
In the interval between Quaker City and the instant case, courts of ap-
peals in two other circuits denied petitions brought by Metropolitan asking
that Board decisions in cases similar in fact and issue to the instant case be
set aside. The Third Circuit affirmed" the Board's certification of a unit
consisting of two of the three district offices of Metropolitan in Delaware. In
ruling that extent of organization had not been allowed to control, the court
noted:
[Wje believe the effect of 9(c) (5) is to require the Board to deter-
mine whether a unit is in and of itself appropriate, apart from the
extent to which the employees are organized. Whether the employees
were controlled by the extent of their organization when they peti-
tioned the Board is not the issue. Rather, it is whether the Board
in determining a unit's appropriateness was so controlled."
The Sixth Circuit also chose to affirm a Board decision37 certifying
Metiopolitan's nine district offices in greater Cleveland, believing that the
"cogent geographical considerations" cited by the Board were not just "sim-
ulated grounds" designed to avoid the prohibition against the use of extent
of organization as a controlling factor."
82 Quaker City Life Ins. Co., supra note 30, at 962.
83 319 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1963).
34 See Senator Taft's comments, supra note 26. See also NLRB v. Moss Amber
Mfg. Co., 264 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1959) ; NLRB v. Smythe, 212 F.2d 664 (5th Cir.
1954) ; NLRB v. Armour & Co., 154 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1946).
38 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1964).
88 Id. at 825-26.
87 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 138 N.L.R.13. 512 (1962).
88 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 62, 65 (6th Cir. 1964).
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In the instant case, the Board rested its decision on the basis that there
had been no recent history of informal collective bargaining among any of
Metropolitan's employees in Rhode Island, that no union was currently seek-
ing a larger unit, that the desired unit was located in a separate and distinct
geographical area, and that each district office of petitioner was a separate
administrative entity. The First Circuit answered that not only did the
cases cited by the Board fail to support its conclusions "but also the crite-
rion of location in a separate and distinct geographical area is not a criterion
consistently applied by the Board" in its decisions." In a specific case, one
or several factors may lead to certification, but there has never been a require-
ment that in all cases, the petitioned unit must be measured against each
and every factor ever used by the Board as a basis for making unit deter-
minations in that industry. Further, one of the cases cited by the Board to
support its position was the Delaware representation proceeding, the record
of which had been incorporated by reference into the record in the instant
case by stipulation of the parties. In that case the Board concluded that the
individual district office of Metropolitan "is in effect a separate administra-
tive entity through which the Employer conducts its business operations, and
therefore is inherently appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining.' 40
The First Circuit went beyond the record to note that the union had
previously tried unsuccessfully to organize the entire state of Rhode Island,
and that it had "not found a single instance since Quaker City wherein the
majority of the Board refused the debit insurance agent unit petitioned for
by the Union."" Merely because the Board had chosen to dispense with its
requirement of state-wide organization in insurance cases, however, need not
lead to a presumption (made, apparently, by the First Circuit) that it had
returned to the policy which had been in effect before the state-wide re-
quirement was introduced in 1944. Rather, according to the Third Circuit:
There is a vast difference between taking away an obstacle to wider
union organization and collective bargaining which is the explicit
legislative purpose and mandate of the Act, and determining appro-
priate units on the basis of employee organization."
The decision of the First Circuit shows that it chose to go off the record
and attempt to prove a subservience of the Board to unions rather than, as
the other circuits chose, to look into the record and determine if there were
facts present to support the Board's conclusions. In ignoring these and de-
ciding that the real basis of certification in this case was extent of organiza-
tion, the First Circuit is in direct disagreement with its two sister circuits.
Had the court fully considered all the grounds for certification found by the
Board, it could have well aligned itself with the positions taken by the other
circuits.
GERALD E. FARRELL
80 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 1, at 909.
4 ° Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 565, 567 (1962).
41 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 1, at 910.
42 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, supra note 35, at 828.
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